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Reconstituted Consonants: The Reach of
a "Common Core" Analogy in Human
Rights
By L. AMEDE OBIORA*
The fundamental goal of this article is to address the possibilities
of a "common core" equivalent for public international law purposes.
The history of the international human rights movement has been
one of gains and setbacks. Ample evidence demonstrates that, although there is a steadily evolving global culture of adherence to
progressive human rights standards, breaches and abuses abound. A
critical constraint revolves around postulations of the universality of
human rights, irrespective of differences in political, socio-economic
and cultural systems. While controversy surrounds the notion of universality, there seems to be some consensus about the need for a
regulatory scheme of planetary proportion, which can restrain abuses
of power and immunize individuals from arbitrary elite interference.
Even actors that are not usually considered political, actors whose
business interests hitherto inhibited their unreserved allegiance to the
cultivation of a social-democratic ethic, are rethinking their positions
and becoming more supportive of the regime for human rights protection.
It is intriguing though, that the ascendance of human rights and
the popular embrace of schemes for trans-boundary accountability
have not been without resistance nor have they readily translated
into concrete implementation. How do we reconcile this inconsistency? How do we augment the prospects for the internationalization of conscience and control? How do we transcend the propagation of norms and principles that could be said to privilege
abstractions over the meaningful achievement of laudable objectives?
* The author teaches at the University of Arizona College of Law. She wishes
to acknowledge the support of the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton, the

editorial assistance of Jessica Wiley and the eternal grace of God.
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To minimize the disparity between the rhetoric and the reality of the
human rights norms, those influenced by the liberal tradition can exercise the option of falling back on elaborate sets of infrastructure
that is in place to actualize and sustain the rule of law. However,
such reliance presupposes the availability of institutions that may not
exist in viable forms across cultures.
The suggestions made in this article to ameliorate discursive polemics and facilitate the resolution of practical impasses regarding
human rights emphasize the domestication of international human
rights norms. Domestication, as envisaged here, entails the illumination of the common grounds, if any, that exist between competing socio-legal systems. While human rights processes are characterized by
diplomatic negotiations, many lesser-developed countries (LDCs) insist that essential aspects were settled before they emerged into independent member States of the United Nations. The argument for
domestication proceeds on the premise that reservations such as
those articulated by LDCs are ultimately indicative of aversions to
being subjected to ideals that are somewhat arbitrarily dictated by
the founding members. They equally signal objections to the depreciation of sovereign autonomy that may be implied thereby. It is reasonable to infer from this premise that a more inclusive paradigm for
the determination of the definitive norms for protection of human
rights, one that abides by the rudimentary principles of participation,
could allay some of the concerns that trigger purported denunciations
of arbitrariness and unilaterality.
In light of this inference, I posit that Rudolf Schlesinger's painstaking documentation Of the potentialities of the resources of the
comparative enterprise are quite pivotal for human rights protection.
To substantiate this claim, I will attempt to state a case for extending
the parameters of the model that Schlesinger utilized in the common
core project at Cornell. Although this model was originally devised
for private law purposes, the baseline for my argument will approach
it as a pertinent precedent for the domain of public international law.'
In celebration of the venerable accomplishments of Professor Schlesinger, it is useful to examine this landmark for enriching lessons that
could further the gains of human rights promulgations. As a preliminary step, I am interested in exploring if and to what extent Schlesinger's findings can be linked to broader efforts to enhance the legiti1. PIERRE BONASSIES ET AL., FORMATION OF CoNTRAcrs: A STUDY OF THE
COMMON CORE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS

(Rudolf Schlesinger ed., 1968).
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macy of these promulgations. I will argue that the successful application of the findings to such a utilitarian end could have a domino effect that would contribute to the revitalization of the pedagogical
value of comparative law.
I trace the contextual framework for my submissions in this article to consecutive meetings that were held at the University of
Michigan and Hastings College of the Law. Accordingly, I will highlight salient criticisms that were expressed at the meetings as a
springboard for my discussion. The article begins with a consideration of some of the criticisms that will be reported. The next section
evaluates the relevance of a common core analogy for the human
fights agenda of the new world order. This section falls into two subparts: the first of these reviews a recurrent blindspot of past comparisons, and the other part interrogates the past for corrective leads.
The final section of the article delineates a series of exercises that
underscore the power of comparisons to dissipate misconceptions
and strengthen understandings among different groups and individuals. This section concludes that conciliating differing worldviews for
the purposes of human rights protection is of pedagogical moment
from the standpoint of comparative law, independent of the benefits
from a policy perspective.
I. Background
Probably the single most prevalent claim advanced by the proponents of a new paradigm is that they can solve the problems that
have led the old one to a crisis ....

All the arguments for a new

paradigm have been based on the competitor's comparative ability
to solve problems.
Thomas Kuhn2
In August 1996, a number of scholars met in Ann Arbor, Michigan to ruminate over the prospects for a paradigm shift that would
reinvigorate and valorize the appeal of comparative law in the United
States. The co-convenor, Mathias Reimann, set the tone for the ensuing deliberations when he proposed that a revision of the role and
agenda of comparative law was inevitable to enhance its status vithin
the legal academy.3 A series of debates followed on this note. One
2. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCruRE OF SCIENTIFIc REVOLUTIONS 153,155
(1970).
3. Mathias Reimann, Why Comparative Law in the United States Must Develop

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 21:921

particular bone of contention had to do with how to categorize comparative law. The competing views were whether comparative law
qualified as a discipline or whether it was best considered a technique. James Gordley maintained that comparative law is not a distinct discipline.4 Nora Demleitner, however, cautioned against reducing the academic specialty to a general curriculum, rather than
conceptualizing it as a systematized course. She noted that characterizing comparative law as a mere methodology would only reinforce and perpetuate myths about its lack of content
Vivian Curran alluded to the intrinsic relevance of the comparative act, locating its significance in cognitive processes that shape understanding, meaning and identity.6 Consistent with Curran's implicit
recognition of the inevitability of comparisons, Michael Ansaldi remarked that it was critical to modify the Eurocentric bias that traditionally circumscribed the range of the field.7 Addressing the issue of
methodology, Jennifer Widner pointed out the impediment posed by
a poverty of arid descriptive inventories of systems that are often devoid of intellectual analysis. She further observed that the field could
be enriched by sustained inquiries as to causality, impact and merit.'
Such inquiries would generate invaluable insights about behaviors,
meanings, institutions and pertinent changes thereof. At a follow-up
meeting at Hastings, Ugo Mattei revisited the shortcomings of the
comparative legal methodology as it is commonly used in AngloAmerican institutions. He warned of the risk of obsolence posed by
inordinate emphasis on description to the detriment of "institutional
engineering." 9
It was obvious that these deliberations were a kind of reaction
against complacency. Indeed the conference participants could be
taken to represent a constituency of scholars who are committed to
Its Own Agenda, 46 AM. J. COMp,. L. (forthcoming 1999).
4. James Gordley, Is Comparative Law a Distinct Discipline?, 46 AM. J. COMP.
L. (forthcoming 1999).
5. Nora Demleitner, The Schism orDo We All Have to Be the Same?, 46 AM. J.
COMP. L. (forthcoming 1999).
6. Vivian Curran, Comparative Law in the United States-Quo Vadis?, 46 AM.
J. CoMP. L. (forthcoming 1999).
7. Michael Ansaldi, Future Directions for American Comparative Law, 46 AM.

J. CoMp. L. (forthcoming 1999).
8. Jennifer Widner, Comparative Politics and Comparative Law, 46 AM. J.

CoMP. L. (forthcoming 1999).
9. Ugo Mattei, An Opportunity Not To Be Missed: The Future of Comparative
Law in the United States, 46 AM. J. CoMP. L. (forthcoming 1999).
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continuous self-analysis and appraisal. Apparently, they are not uncritically predisposed to any settled traditions of their vocation.
Their critiques reflect commendable aspirations for excellence, which
are quite healthy for the dynamic development of the comparative
enterprise. One cannot afford to be heedless of the reasonable forebodings that could be teased out of them-especially since they are
integral to an understanding of a scheme which would enhance the
viability and vitality of comparative law.
In what follows, I will discuss some of the concerns voiced by the
critics. While acknowledging these concerns, my discussion necessarily presumes the possibility that the consciousness of a crisis,
which underlies or emerges from these critiques, may well be overstated. Inspired criticism about the onslaught of a crisis and the depreciation of the status of comparative law in the academy are perennial. Historical antecedents abound. As early as 1949, for example,
H.C. Gutteridge mused over the insecurity of comparative law, noting that
it largely obtains in an atmosphere of hostility and indiffer1
ence. 0
Drawing upon the legacies of luminaries such as Rudolf Schlesinger, I will explore an alternative view. To this end, I will attempt
to illuminate the enormous potential of the comparative technique in
the present age. It is true that it is bedeviled by several drawbacks
and that many have been remiss in their perfunctory implementation
of it. Nevertheless, it is certainly hasty to render a requiem for the
technique. The three main issues that I intend to tackle in the next
section relate to criticisms revolving around the categorization, Eurocentric bias and gratuitous nature of comparative law. I consider the
matter of categorization within a somewhat vague rubric which I
have designated "False Dichotomy." The remaining concerns about
politics and purpose will be incorporated into my general elucidation
of how to revamp comparative law should there be a verifiable need.
H. False Dichotomy
The spirited exchanges articulated at the meetings at Hastings
and Michigan initially prompted me to marvel at the allure and pitfalls of binary reasoning in general as well as its fallacies in the particular context under consideration. To begin with, it is plausible that
the legitimacy deficit or crisis of the subject, if indeed there is one,
10. H.C.

GUTI'ERIDGE,

COMPARATIVE

COMPARATIVE METHOD OF LEGAL STUDY

LAW:

AN

INTRODUCTION

& RESEARCH 23 (1949).

TO THE
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has less to do with whether or not it is derivative and therefore not a
distinctive discipline, and more to do with its impact or lack thereof.
In other words, any prevailing crisis may be best understood as a
commentary on a perceived lack of relevance. Preliminary clarifications regarding categorization may be premature and a specific categorization of comparative law may not even be necessary to address
the erosion of interest in it. It is arguable that the subject is afflicted
in whatever form it is currently manifesting. If per Demleitner's suggestion, it has been enacted as a discipline, it is crisis-ridden as such.
The same holds if one embraces Gordley's supposition of comparative law as a conceptual tool or methodology.
Moreover, it is far from clear that the bifurcation into disciplinary theory and method does not present its own problems. At some
point, the distinction blurs. For instance, methodology can be theoretical if it is equated to praxeology that addresses instrumental value
or effectiveness.11 Additionally, curricular boundaries in legal education tend to be largely artificial. Not even core first year courses can
boast of distinctiveness or exclusivity. In many instances, there is
significant overlap between courses. Indeed, if one were to adopt the
Kantian definition of a discipline, it is arguable that few subjects of
law would qualify as such. According to Kant, to define a discipline
is:
[T]o determine accurately that peculiar feature which no other sci-

ence has in common with it, and which constitutes its specific characteristic .... The characteristic of a science may consist of a simple difference of object, or of the source of knowledge, or of the
kind of knowledge, or perhaps of all three together....""
One would be hard pressed to think of any course that has a unique

object or source of knowledge or theory. Regarding the last characteristic enumerated by Kant, namely the kind of theory, there may be
some possibility of sustaining a claim about disciplinary status."
11. ELIZABETH STEINER, METHODOLOGY OF THEORY BUILDING 25 (1988)
("Knowledge of what means are effective with respect to given ends would be
knowledge of ideals or practice.").
c
12. IMMANUEL KANT, PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE METAPHYSIcS

1 (Peter

Lucas trans., 1953).
13. Kant sorted theory as involving: " [A] distinction according to content, by
virtue of which they are either merely explicative and add nothing to the content of
knowledge, or ampliative and enlarge the given knowledge; the former can be called
analytic judgements, the latter synthetic judgements." Id. 1 2. Thus, there could be
a theory of form or content. Pure mathematics and logic in their syntactical dimensions are disciplines of form that do not add content to knowledge. Synthetic theory,
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Even here, comparative law may have as much of potential as any
other law courses.
Akin to this perspective, Jerome Hall once took issue with Gutteridge's skeptical categorization of comparative law as a mere "convenient label attached to a particular method of study and research.""' Conceding that there may be no such thing as comparative
positive law in the literal sense,' Hall insisted that Gutteridge went
too far in dismissing comparative law as only a method.16 He contested the sweeping implications of this claim and referenced Harald
Hoffding's dictum, "to think is to compare," to conclude that to be
sapiens is to be a comparatist.'7 Continuing, Hall pointed out that it
was inconsistent to maintain a methodological view of comparative
law, while reckoning its import for the social context and function of
law. To him, this inconsistency suggested a definite theory of comparative law as a type of knowledge, a social science."8 Arguing that if
"the comparative method" applied to law produced any knowledge, it
is that knowledge which is of primary importance, he asserted that
comparative law is both a method and a composite normative theory.
This is insofar as it seeks to uncover the ideals that would give conon the other hand, is a theory of content. The content of theory is constituted by its
elements or parts. The basic elements of a theory are its concepts. The concepts of
theory are general ideas that describe the properties of the object of the theorizing.
Concepts are related to form universal generalizations that describe relations between properties. Universal generalizations related to form systems entail selections
that require discrimination or exclusion. See STEINER, supra note 11, at 19,29.
14. JEROME HALL, COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY 41 (1963).
15. GUTTERIDGE, supra note 10, at 1. "If by [comparative] 'law' we mean a body

of rules, it is obvious that there can be no such thing as 'comparative' law. The process of comparing rules of law taken from different systems does not result in a formulation of any independent rules for the regulation of human relationships or
transactions." Id
16. HALL, supra note 14, at 8.
17. Id at 9-10. Comparison is involved in all methods of scholarly investigation.
It is characteristic of all intellectual functions whose purpose is the discovery of
sameness and difference. Id. at 9,20.
18. In material respects, one cannot compare legal rules, institutions and systems
without venturing beyond forms to understand how they function; neither can one
know how they function without situating them within a broader societal and ideational context. See H.W. EHRMANN, COMPARATIVE LEGAL CULTURES 6-11 (1976);
MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 11 (discussing Rabel's lasting insights). This is precisely because the dynamics of law are deeply intertwined with the other forces and processes of society. After all, in the proverbial
phrase of one doyen of the legal profession, Oliver Wendell Holmes, law is not a
brooding omnipresence in the sky. Understanding the law in its entirety indeed generates knowledge.
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scious direction to legal reform. 9 As he put it, "there is a certain
knowledge acquired by the comparative method, even though opinions may differ as to whether that knowledge comprises a distinct discipline."" Perhaps, in light of this last note, Gordley and Demleitner
touch on two faces of the same coin."
I contend that the contemporary significance of comparative law
rests on how much the knowledge it helps to generate can be brought
to bear on the resolution of complex tasks of the day. It may well be
that comparative law has no sustainable claim to a transcendental,
coherent and comprehensive content, independent of the theories
and practices with which it engages. Nevertheless, it is certainly significant that it is can be utilized to marshal (dis)similarities in a mode
which can expose contradictions and ambiguities. At the very least,
its descriptive explications of pertinent properties can be foundational and instructive for meaningful socio-legal "engineering." To
effectively undertake a concrete construction, one must be well acquainted with and able to criticize theory. One cannot judge the
adequacy of theory until one sets forth what the theory is or unfolds
its content and form. It is only upon a solid command of extant theory that one can judge or evaluate what, if anything, needs to be
done. Explication is the prelude to evaluations that apply particular
criteria of judgment to a relevant theory. Elizabeth Steiner made a
similar point aptly, albeit in another context. Paraphrasing her, one
does not engineer from scratch.'
Given that explication and evaluation lead to correction or enhancement, even seemingly pedestrian and didactic descriptions have
instrumental value, above and beyond their intrinsic worth. Historically, comparative law has engaged prevailing legal systems, delineating their properties and dynamics. Instead of being limited for use
in episodic isolations of discursive variables and properties or geared
towards questionable unification or harmonization of laws, many of
the elemental and encyclopedic resources accumulated in comparative law could be employed to construct substantive system critiques.
19. HALL, supra note 14, at 13, 44.
20. Id. at 15.
21. See supra text accompanying notes 4 & 5.

22. STEINER, supra note 11, at 29. Criticism or the act of discernment consists of
explication via description and interpretation and evaluation or bringing standards of
judgment to bear. Descriptive theory does not involve normative judgement according to a criterion. But its implicit explication is inevitable for constructive corrections or additions. Id. at 1.
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Better still, fresh explorations could be undertaken to accommodate
the needs of the day. Although a solely descriptive inquiry could
have a considerable functional importance in facilitating the interpretations, understandings and extensions of extant theories and systemsn superficial familiarization or depiction can only go so far. Indeed, Mattei and Widner rightly call attention to the extent to which
sterile and myopic descriptions which do not bode well can shortchange potential contributions.
A. The Reclamation of a Role
Comparison is a name for all operations in which identities and incompatibilities in evidential force are determined ....

It is a blan-

ket term for the entire complex of operations by which some existences are selectively instituted as data and other existential
materials are eliminated as having nothing to do with the case ....
John Dewey 4
Although minds are divided regarding the definition of comparative law, an indication of the purposes for which it may be employed
could engender less of a disagreement. Gutteridge was probably correct in stating that the essential problem is not what is comparative
law. To him, the question of real importance addresses the practical
aspects and values of comparative legal studies.' In calculating what
comparative law has to offer legal theory and pedagogy, neither a
comparative framework nor process of analysis is enough. As Curran's tempering reminder against the excesses of skepticism suggests,
the comparative act is a veritable empirical and pervasive occurrence.
Its significance derives from its rootedness in human cognition and
culture. Being a natural process, it requires no justification. However, to thrive as an academic specialty, it is worthwhile to ensure
that it remains a viable means of tackling emerging challenges. Otherwise, concerns about the exhaustion of its usefulness would be vail23. Description and systematic relation of constituent parts are integral elements

of theory making and can be applied to that end. Descriptive comparisons generate

qualitative data that inform theory building, reconciliation and generalizability.
Later, I will zero in on the last aspect to argue that a major jurisprudential contribution would be to aid the reexamining of the notion of universality central to theories
of law. In this respect, I will engage comparative law as both a means and an end.
That is, as a competent methodology for ascertaining effective ways of indigenizing
human rights and as a body of knowledge about the effective ideals or practices.
24. JOHN DEWEY, LOGIc: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY 184 (1938).
25. GUTERIDGE, supra note 10, at 5,9.
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dated. In this vein, a crucial question is how to map out a more effective domain that reinvents the vigor of comparative law. 6
Comparative law presupposes the existence of a plurality of legal
rules and institutions that it studies to establish to what extent they
are identical or different.7 In the United States, it may be tradition
bound and oriented towards a set of historical practices that threaten
its integrity. However, there is nothing irremediably constrictive
about that approach. It can be reappraised both to inform the present and future differently. An abiding strength of the specialty is the
capacity to survey a repertoire of issues and principles in ways that
illuminate their essences. By virtue of their interest and training,
comparatists often have an exceptional capacity, which can help satisfy the craving for generality or the quest for what is common to all
entities. Rather than merely entertaining comparison for its own
sake and contrasting commonalities and differences in orthodox descriptive endeavors, comparative undertakings could give greater
play to more critical and functional analyses. Here again, maximizing
this advantage would involve putting more emphasis on the instrumental uses of comparisons. This emphasis is, by no means, a denial
of the past uses and abuses of comparative law, some of which are detailed below.
B. Lessons from Past Experiences
For the most part, comparative law tends to reflect a normative
preference for the "dominant" system. A corollary of -this tendency
is to address other systems as discrepant. The potential for hierarchization which inheres in the processes of exclusions and differentiations that mark comparative expositions perpetuate the marginal and
particularized relationship of some systems to those already estab-

26. The idiom of reinvention does not anticipate going back to the historical

practices that brought about some of the difficulties in question. Evidently, some of
the alleged disrepute or lack of interest in comparative law can be seen as a backlash

from some long-standing practices that make it a victim of its own traditions. The

metaphor of shifting gears to accelerate, neutralize or reverse captures what is contemplated by reinvention. The reflective mood among many in response to the perceived erosion of legitimacy suggests that neither shifting into neutral nor reversing
is much of an option. Only a discriminating allegiance to history will suffice for the
challenge at hand.
27. Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants:A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law,
39 AM. J. COMP. L. 4-5 (1991); SIR JOHN WILLIAM SALMON, JURISPRUDENCE 8 (7th
ed. 1924).
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lished as dominant and ostensibly universal." To the extent that
comparative discourses are susceptible to use in constructing relationships of domination and subordination across and within cultures,
it is plausible to argue that they are in positions of mute support to
questionable power asymmetry.?
An important insight of Quine's refutation of crude empiricism
is that there is no objective system of value out there to be discovered
by some neutral observer.' Research is seldom value-neutral, but ultimately normative and political. One cannot simply perceive "facts"
without regarding them through the specficities of her subject location in a conceptual and linguistic culture!' A researcher's situatedness means that her project may be influenced by pre-existing convictions and biases as if she is looking through a colored prism. With
heightened awareness, distorting shades in the perceptual lens can be
mitigated.
The average Anglo-American comparatist is apt to take the intrinsic supremacy and universality of Western constructs for
granted.' Even though many may pay lip service to value-neutrality,
28. Popular standards and modes of comparisons in American legal education
often structure the legal systems of the West and the "Rest" hierarchically. Ordinarily, the consciousness of self implies a notion distinct from self. Although priorities
may not be overtly enforced, some comparatists barely disguise their roles as handmaidens of a "mission civilizatrice" that is bent on imposing the particularities of a
culture in the guise of a synthesized world culture. Compare IMMANUEL MAURICE
WALLERSTEIN, GEOPOLITICS AND GEOCULTURE: ESSAYS ON THE CHANGING WORLDSYSTEM 196 (1991).
29. See JOAN ScoTr, GENDER AND HISTORY (1992). Failure to historicize and

problematize the taken-for-granted obscures its limitation and offers no concrete
guidance on how to address the limitations. A more critical stance would be concerned with how the existing order came into being and what the possibilities are for
change in that order, in other words, it would explore the potential for change and
help construct strategies for change. Compare Robert Cox, CriticalPolitical Economy, in INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL DISORDER
31 (Bjorn Hettne ed., 1995).

30. Compare, eg., ELIZABETH TONKIN ET AL., HISTORY AND ETHNIcrrY 1, 10
(1989).
31. See George Fletcher, The Universal and the Particularin Comparative Law,
46 AM. J. CoMP. L. (forthcoming 1999). Fletcher is not insensitive to the danger of
infinite perspectivism which inheres at the opposite end of the spectrum where each

being is locked in her own individual perspectives on the world, inhibited from all
forms of communication across cultures and entities. To him, the challenge is to find

a way to account for the restraints of ingrained conceptual apparatus of the investigator besides sliding into perspectivist isolationism.
32. This limitation relates to Ansaldi's comment about a Eurocentric focus which
lacks sensitivity to the historical specificity and cultural contingency of the province

of law. See Ansaldi, supra note 7. As will be shown later, this has consequences, not
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their practices are profoundly political. By definition, comparisons

are relational. More often than not, they are not merely a matter of
drawing comparisons. Instead, they are value-laden and ridden with

subjectivist assumptions. Identifying legal constants or potential dimensions of convergence implies ascertaining correlative differences
and divergences. Incidentally, these divergences can be deployed for
political purposes,33 as indicated by orientalist deprecations of the
manifestations of law in other cultural milieux. 4

Rodolfo Sacco broached a similar issue in criticizing objections
to the comparability of the legal systems of peoples who do not have
a written language, tracing it to the positivist conception of law as the
creature of the state.35

Conversely, a fascination with difference

caused some comparatists with functionalist inklings to neglect the
need for reform in foreign systems out of fear of disrupting the culjust for comparative law as a specialty, but for both the culture of origin of an implicated comparatist and for the object of her comparison.
33. Some were oblivious of these political incidents and their perception was that
they were engaged in value-neutral endeavors. Under the impression that descriptive comparative law is a contentless conceptual tool which has no aim other than
furnishing information, Gutteridge, for example, maintained that it was no concern
of the person presiding over a comparative undertaking to ascertain what use the results of the investigations will be applied or to express normative opinion about reform. See GUTTERIDGE, supra note 10, at 8.

34. Listening to some of the observations made at the Michigan and Hastings
meetings, I could not help wondering to what extent comparatists foster the ghettoization or mystification of comparative law as an "exotica" that is "right but not
quite." In this vein, I do not think that descriptiveness, per se, is solely to blame.
Consider the tendency to stereotype and showcase Afro-Asiatic legal systems as
anomalous. One would think that comparative undertakings are well equipped to
dissipate misconceptions that underlie popular xenophobia. Yet, ethnocentric enactments of such undertakings reproduce some of the very biases that penetrating
comparisons could counter.
35. It appears, however, that it was contradictory of him to conclude that the
constitutive elements of law are found in the work of legislators, scholars, and courts.
What becomes of the so-called stateless societies without such infrastructures? Are
they devoid of "legal formants"? A reading of this conclusion would also seem to
suggest that extra-legal rules of social ordering are not valid objects of comparison.
See Sacco, supra note 27, at 7, 34. Many accomplished comparatists recognize the
dangers of such a narrow or singular focus. Law, after all, is not autonomous. See
BERNHARD GROSSFELD, THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 8
(1990). It is conceivable that Sacco envisages the availability of "legal formants" in
the transactions of native tribunals that administer the rules of customary law. Here,
in addition to the risk of distortion, there is also the problem of invention. In light of
this, one may wonder how much of a core is the "common core," given its vulnerability to questionable properties. Although the possibility of error should not be
paralyzing, it underscores the need to proceed cautiously and tentatively, taking not
even the profile of the authority or custodian for granted.
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ture-bound destiny of so-called noble savages.6 Typically, much of
the concern about the divergence of legal systems is represented in
terms of dogmatic abstractions that portray them as objective. This is
a "naturalistic fallacy" that often serves to reinforce and replicate the
limitations of the status quo and its grand narratives.
Comparative law's "naturalistic fallacy" is problematic on several levels. I will touch on a couple of them. First, failure to convey
knowledge of a system in all its complexities may prompt premature
or ill-conceived "missionary" interventions. This is not to suggest
that change is invariably inimical. To the contrary, extant systems
are social constructs informed by specific histories and perspectives.
This contingency reveals another fallacy of the pretext of objectivity:
because prevailing systems embody selective discourses, they necessarily imply exclusions and inherent conflicts. Uncritical accounts
that mask these exclusions and conflicts have pertinent consequences
and risk emphasizing detrimental surface reality.'
The risk is especially great for projects that assume the possibility and seek to ascertain the existence of a "common core." Indeed,
part of the attraction of any principle that can be laid validly bare as
being constitutive of a common core comes from the understanding
that it is distilled from models or building blocks that are germane
and representative. 9 Hence, the need for cautious embrace. Against
36. L. Amede Obiora, ReconsideringAfrican Customary Law, 17 LEGAL STUD.
F. 217 (1993).
37. L. Amede Obiora, Bridges andBarricades:Rethinking Polemics and Intransigence in the Campaign Against Female Circumcision,47 CASE W. RES. L REv. 275

(1997).
38. Authoritative statements of a rule or principle do not necessarily capture the
operational dynamics of the rule. See Gordley, supra note 4, at 3; Sacco, supra note
27, at 25. One scholar has argued that the focus on rules is superficial and misleading
because the critical dimensions of legal systems are found beyond the rules and because it assumes that a significant rapprochementhas been accomplished if rules are
made to resemble each other. See John Henry Merryman, The Convergence (and
Divergence) of the Civil Law and the Common Law, in NEW PERSPECnVES FOR A
COMMON LAW OF EuRoPE 222 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1978).

39. My modest comparative explorations have sensitized me to the regularity of
a dissonance between normative rhetoric and everyday reality; hence, the need to
look beyond surfaces and carefully interrogate both sources and practices. This particularly applies to endeavors that deal with sparsely documented sources where
there is ample room for the invention of traditions and other ostensible claims. Take
for instance, African customary law. Many, although quick to identify African legal
systems as pluralistic, often fall short of appreciating the nuances and complexities of
this categorization. Scholars are only just beginning to illuminate the tensions that
attended the constitution of the usually objectivized customary law and the implications thereof. See, e.g., Obiora, supra note 36, at 3; L. Amede Obiora, New Wine,
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this backdrop, I will propose one way to consolidate, apply and anchor comparisons to uncover theoretical foundations and minimize
practical risks or errors. To minimize erroneous consequences, the
ensuing discussions affirm the beauty of comparisons in which,
through dialogue and mutual comprehension, ordinarily ethnocentric
or seemingly inscrutable standards are subjected to the principles of
proceduralist justice. To substantiate the rest of my proposal, I will
rely upon analogies of insights from Schlesinger's common core project.
C. Leads from a Prior Experiment
Functional comparisons provide a means for determining if any
abstract principles are common to all systems of law. The utility of
such comparisons to aid the realization of the human rights objectives
cannot be overestimated. Comparatists can directly collaborate on
attempts to clarify the sentiments that are often construed as consensus on human rights or they can design their routine explorations in a
way that will contribute to the groundwork for more precise investigations regarding human rights. The project that Schlesinger spearheaded offers a precedent in this respect. It is intuitive to shy away
from such undertakings because of the vast amount of work and expense that may be involved. But the obstacles in the way of actualizing the project ought not detract from its promise. Schlesinger's
painstaking universalist project exemplifies the possibilities that can
come with care, commitment and consistency."
Remarking on the enormous significance of the :international
operation, Otto Kahn-Freund, contends that the hypothesis that
there exists, among a major portion of the world's legal systems, a
common ground or a common core hardly needs verification, but that
it is the nature and scope of its application that needs verification."
In this view, the genius of the Cornell project partly issues from the
success with which it measured, weighed and delineated the core.
With regards to human rights, the hypothesis reiterates the premise
for the recognition of general principles of law as a source of international law. However, the stridence of oppositions cautions against asOld Skin: (En)GagingNationalism, Traditionalism and Gender Relations, 28 IND. L.

REv. 3 (1995).

40. BONASSIES ET AL., supra note 1.

41. Otto Kahn-Freund, ComparativeLaw in Action, 18 AM. J. COMp. L. 429, 434
(1970) (reviewing FORMATION OF CONTRACrS: A STUDY OF THE COMMON CORE OF

LEGAL SYSTEMS).
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suming that the hypothesis itself is self-evident. So far, it appears
that refuting relativism and allegations of unilateral impositions of ex
ante determinations under the guise of human rights requires stepping back to show the very existence of commonality before demonstrating the extent to which it might obtain. Such verification entails
comparative methodology on a grand scale that would necessarily incorporate international cooperation as both a process and an outcome.
Despite the demonstrable value and success of the common core
project, it simply cannot be taken for granted that the project is amenable to adaptation for human rights purposes. Therefore, it would
be worthwhile to establish that similar efforts are possible and beneficial, and that it would not be too elusive and ambitious to attempt
to investigate and infer a common core in the matter of human
rights."2 Apparently, Schlesinger's "common core," which mainly
consists of techniques, is distinguishable from substantive legal policies or purposes. That the common core project is possible for commercial ventures that presuppose the existence of certain principles
and institutions does not mean that it would necessarily work on
questions of morality which tend to be more incommensurable.
Kahn-Freund notes that the narrow mechanics of offer and acceptance were chosen because they are "ethically, socially [and] politically, near the point of absolute indifference." 3 He suggests that the
differing history, social organization and ethical or religious convictions of the body politic mean that the common cores may be smaller
and more difficult to demonstrate in other areas.'
Schlesinger had no illusions about the limitations of the common
core research. He reckoned that substantial social and political
problems usually cannot be solved merely by the application of existing law. Rather, their peaceful resolution requires the creation,
through patient negotiations, of new agreements, programs and institutions.45 While cognizant that the common core is not a panacea that
will automatically lead to a full flowering of the rule of law in international relations, he submitted that, without a basic store of shared no42. A former dean of Cornell stated a similar inquiry more broadly, asking
whether there is reason to suppose that the "common core" would be substantial in
areas more closely linked to social policy. See Bertram F. Willcox, Rudolf B. Schlesinger: World Lawyer, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 919, 925 (1975).
43. Kahn-Freund, supra note 41, at 430.
44. Id at 431.
45. BoNAssIs E AL., supra note 1.
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tions and principles, it will be most difficult
to draft and implement
46
the instruments that will inspire progress.
The quest for rapprochement, which lies at the heart of contemporary efforts to verify a common core, coincides with -the principle
of universality that is axiomatic to the human rights regime.47 The
common core analogue in public international law, which is the underlying assumption for the universalist orientation of human rights,
finds particular expression in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. This stipulation directs the court to apply,
among other rules, the general principles of law recognized by socalled "civilized" nations.' In general, the "universalist" view of law
exercised a marked influence on the development of modern comparative law.49 In fact, the intellectual foundations of Rudolf Schlesinger's Cornell project have been identified as fundamentally universalist.' It seems to be inherent in the thesis that, insofar as legal
systems share similar socio-economic conditions, they are bound to
converge in their analysis of private law problems." This search for a
common core also reflects both an appeal to functionalism and realism when it discounts the force of philosophical, cultural and other
differences to privilege outcomes.
46. Compare GUTIERIDGE, supra note 10, at 71 n.2 ("A strong affinity exists between comparative research in the case of private law problems and the research
which must precede any attempt to codify the law of nations.").
47. It is the impetus for drives to globalize the legal regime as reflected in the
works of development policy practitioners and human rights activists. See David
Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement:Some Reflection on the Crisis of Law and Development Studies in the United States, 4 Wis. L. REv. 1062 (1974);
Lawrence Friedman, On Legal Development, 24 RUTGERS L, REV. 11 (1969); HENRY
STEINER & PHILLIP ALSTON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT (1996).
48. For a discussion of how comparisons are vital for ascertaining the general
principles of public international law, see INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMPARATIVE

PERSPEcrIvE (William E. Butler ed., 1980).
49. Tracing the cross-currents of understandings among comparatists, Gutteridge
illuminates the impetus for universalism. In his account, the commitment emanates
from the view that the object of comparative legal research is the discovery of abstract notions which underlie all systems of law and can be used to build up a common system of jurisprudence. As he put it, owing to a belief that all modern systems
of law are based on certain common principles that constitute the "natural law with
variable content," comparatists began to aim at an analysis of conflicting rules of law
and the construction of a synthesis which would enable a worldwide code to be
framed acceptable to all nations. He explains that attempts to secure unification
were not always possible because the times were not ripe for the translation into action of the conception of worldwide law. See GUTrERIDGE, supra note 10, at 6, 18.
50. Fletcher, supra note 31, at 11-12.
51. Id.
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Indeed, the dramatic intensification of the transnational movement of persons, goods, services and capital, as well as the unprecedented conflicts that are arising from the phenomena, compel serious
attention and cry for creative solutions that have some resonance
across the board. In part, realist and universalist claims are an attempt to respond to this need. In this sense, they are at once a result
and a reflection of the formidable spirit of the time. Although today's circumstances are more propitious and opportune for the utilization of comparative legal research resources to create the space for
and affirmatively help resolve common problems, universal codifications of human rights continue to run into obstacles. A key task at
hand is to find creative means to assuage resistance and accomplish
articulated objectives. To probe deeply for a definite purpose such as
human rights legitimization, an investigator must ascertain how far
perceived differences are fundamental. Secondly, she must determine the causes underlying such differences and their relation to the
general structure of the system in which they arise. Finally, she must
examine the implications of the environment within which the rules
exist.'
D. (Re)EnvisionedBoundary
The intensity of global interaction results in an interpenetration
of cultures and experiences. Because of the increasing immediacy of
these encounters, there is a strong temptation to formulate a single
response for matters at hand. The homogenized response, however,
is often loaded in favor of a specific culture. Schlesinger's Cornell
project was conceived to attain such singularity. To allow for penetrating appraisals while attenuating ethnocentrism, Schlesinger consulted and employed the help of experts who were members of the
States whose systems were involved in the project.' In more recent
times, Schlesinger forcefully earmarked the search for the common
core of legal systems or for functional equivalents to aid relevant
harmonizations of law as an incident of globalization.' As a prelimi52. GUTrERIDGE, supra note 10, at 9.
53. Some minimize the constraints of cultural blinkers that interfere with comparisons by relying on local comparatists, instead of importing alien experts. This
was the case in the Cornell project. The exemplary approach could be revised for
more improved results by drawing, not just on so-called experts, but on the insights
of regular folks.
54. Referring to the European experience, Schlesinger indicated that the emergence of the European Union makes it imperative to undertake integrative compari-

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 21:921

nary observation, he postulated a remarkable convergence of substance among seemingly divergent systems. In his words, "the areas
of agreement among legal systems are larger than those of disagreement."'5 A parallel presupposition triggers claims of universality in
the human rights realm, a claim that is often prone to serious disputation.
Herein lies the point of departure for my proposal. The universalist bent of the common core project emphasizes a convergence of
outcomes. My invocation of a common core is qualified by a willingness to affirm a core, whether it manifests in the form of difference or
likeness. At first glance, this assertion seems awkward, given that
Schlesinger's project verified commonalities. I posit, however, that
the core insight of that project is quite elastic and subject to reconceptualization 6 Historically, comparatists have been inclined to
stress similarity over its antithesis. However, this orientation is not
intrinsic to the enterprise. Comparative law has been defined as an
intellectual activity in an international context with law as its object
and comparison as its process.' It points up differences just as much
as it documents similarities. Either of the two or any of their combination could be reconstituted as consonants in view of a particular
end. If indeed, as Isaiah Berlin suggested, the only reliable human
universal is human difference, then there is nothing to preclude difference from being the "common core" that should constitute the
point of reference or take-off point for any universalization or standardization.'
Recalling Schlesinger's model and his acknowledgment that difsons of the Members' laws and legal systems in order to establish the scholarly foundation for a new jus commune. See Rudolph B. Schlesinger, The Past and Future of
Comparative Law, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 477, 479 (1995).
55. Id.

56. Interestingly, the limitations of efforts to map out the scope and borders of
agreement are invariably illuminated by "common core" research. This is because
such research ends up exposing instances of disagreement. Identifying constants or
dimensions of convergence implicate corresponding differences or divergence. To
speak of one implies the other.
57. See 1 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 6 (Tony Weir trans., 1987).
58. If a universal, difference is irrepressible and the focus on identifying commonalities cannot erase the implications of irreducible human distinctiveness. Even
a singularly defined quest for similarities exposes differences as the two exist in relation to each other. Compare Curran, supra note 6, at 7. However, Curran admits
that comparison relies on differences, since identifying similarity is possible only in
the context of non-similarity or difference.
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ficult cases require novel and serious initiatives, the following section
suggests strategies that can foster intra- and inter-cultural communications about basic human rights. It elaborates a position that is consistent with ongoing attempts to articulate some minimum criteria
that could help resolve recurrent controversies pertaining to universalism. The advantage of hindsight calls for a few disclaimers or caveats. This position differs qualitatively from comparisons of resemblances and differences that primarily seek to replace conflicting
codes of conduct with a singular rule that all can be induced to adopt.
It is distinguishable from efforts which fabricate some ideal norm
without sustained deliberation in the hope that it will be used to reduce or eliminate, so far as possible and desirable, the discrepancies
between national systems. Were its target the achievement or the
adoption of a predetermined model per se, sharp criticisms could be
levied against it for reproducing the mistakes of the past. The position anticipates first order comparisons that involve critical analyses
to ascertain if there are common principles or purposes that can be
synthesized to provide a foundation or framework for human rights
protection.59

.The impetus for my revisionist reading of Schlesinger's comparative project for social policy purposes derives from the conviction
that, coupled with utilitarian arguments, it may be possible to articulate a veil of morality which could work across cultures. This conviction is borne out of my previous research on contentious moral or
cultural dilemmas that can ultimately be resolved through mutual respect and understanding.' My postulation in this article is that comparative analyses are indispensable for this process. It is through
carefully executed comparisons that we come to mutual respect and
understanding. It is only then that we can have the non-threatening
atmosphere that is conducive for broaching or tackling difficult cases.
Jacques Maritain made a similar case in arguing for intellectual justice as a social good. In his view, what matters is to have respect for
the intellect even if, in its endeavors, it appears to us that it has
missed the point and to be attentive to disentangling and setting free
every seed of truth, whatever it may be. Arguing that even philosophers should be capable, if not of cooperating, at least of understanding and practicing justice toward each other, he reasoned that:
59. See L. Amede Obiora, Toward an Auspicious Reconciliation of International
and ComparativeAnalyses, 46 AM. J. CoMP. L. (forthcoming 1999).
60. Obiora, supra note 37.
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[I]f we do not love the thought and intellect of another as intellect
and thought, how shall we take pains to discover what truths are
conveyed by it while it seems to us defective or misguided, and at
the same time to free these truths from the errors which prey upon
them and to reinstate them in an entirely true systematization?61
Comparison of societies belonging to different socio-economic
formations and experiences necessarily involves the comparison of
differences that have important implications for the content, meaning, implementation and reform of normative formulations and
frameworks.6' Variations in historical, political, cultural and socioeconomic circumstances mean that problems are hardly identical
across societies.6 As Michael Walzer noted, even highly similar encounters and transactions are necessarily differentiated when they
engage individuals and groups of people with different, cultures, histories and expectations. 6 Accordingly, he argues that the best arrangement is relative to the history and culture of the people whose
lives it addresses.64
Similar caveats have been echoed by several other commentators
who argued for an enhancement of the value of comparative law by
applying its method beyond the discovery of common principles of
private law. According to Gutteridge, a more preeminent value lies
in the employment of comparative law as a corrective for the tendency to privilege a specific system above all. He is not alone in espousing this view, and it is as commonly held today as in the past.
Earlier in the century, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht warned that to attribute to one system of a particular time and space the qualities of a
universal law and to see in it a vehicle of the development of international law, may well result in checking that development."' 6 More re61. Jacques Maritain, Philosophical Cooperation and Intellectual Justice, in THE
44-45 (1952).
62. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 4 (1974); GUrrERIDGE, supra note 10,
at 174; Otto Kahn-Freund, Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV.
1,27 (1974).
63. Lawrence Rosen aptly observes that it does not take much of a difference to
make a difference. To underscore this point, he notes that human beings share 98
percent of their genetic code with chickens and 90 percent with yeast, yet the differences between humans, yeast and chickens are colossal.
RANGE OF REASON

64.

MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION

6-7 (1997).

65. BLAISE PASCAL, PENStES [THOUGHTS] 81 (1937) ("By the pure light of reason, nothing is just per se: it all depends on time. What is just is determined by custom, simply by dint of being accepted as such .... ).
66. SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 178 (1927).
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cently, Konrad Zweigert & Hein K6tz issued a correspondent remark. To them, optimal measures result from laying bare the essentials of relevant systems, country by country, and then using this material as a basis for critical comparison that could end up with
conclusions that may involve a reinterpretation of all the systems.'
In their words:
If one accepts that legal science includes not only the techniques of
interpreting the texts, principles, rules, and standards of a national
system, but also the discovery of models of preventing or resolving
social conflicts, then it is clear that the method of comparative law
can provide a much richer range of model solution simply because
the different systems of the world can offer a greater variety of solutions than even the most imaginative jurist who was corralled in
his own system."s
History attests to the particular relevance of these sentiments
vis-d-vis human rights. Since inception, the human rights regime has
been quagmired in controversy due to its perceived partiality and reliance on the ethical undercurrent of a dominant culture as if it is a
self-evident standard of verity. Those who identify the regime with
the West express discontent with the approach. It is interesting that
many of these parties are willing to concede to the need for a transcendental system that curbs leviathan excesses. The resounding sentiment among scholars and activists is that a regime of human rights
or its equivalent is inevitable, given emergent conditions of modernity. Nevertheless, many refrain from unequivocally supporting the
existing system for various reasons.
The crux of opposition to human rights frequently manifests in
the form of a divide between universalism and relativism. The universalism-relativism controversy reflects a disagreement concerning
the basis of human rights. By virtue of its liberal underpinnings, universalism subscribes to the Enlightenment notion that there is something called a common human nature, a metaphysical substrate in
which "rights" are embedded and that this substrate takes moral
precedence over all merely "cultural" superstructures.6 9 Relativism,
on the other hand, is defined by and responds to the real risk that
universalist concerns about human rights are underlaid with an as67.

ZWEIGERT & KOTz, supra note 57.
68. Id. at 15.
69. RicHARD RORTY, OBJECnIvrry, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH 207 (1991) (but,
the belief in such a substrate may itself be a cultural bias).
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sumption of the superiority of a specific standpoint which holds competing views in contempt." These days no one seriously believes in
the absolutes of these principles; they appear to be increasingly
abandoned in light of the contemporary conditions of everyday life.
Yet, on account of them, it seems as if the culture of human rights
can sometimes be aptly characterized as a culture of contentions, posturings and contradictions.
For our immediate purposes, the disagreement between universalists and relativists can be recast as embodying the essence of a
struggle over who will control the site of social reproduction and
regulation. In the rights language of the universalist, to privilege the
community is to endanger individual autonomy and to create a situation for the claims of the collective to collide with and trump those of
the individual. In reality, however, the relationship between the individual and the community is not always, nor need it be, antagonistic.
Affirming a communal resource or a particular practice may, simultaneously, be seen as amounting to an endorsement of communal reproduction and as an affirmation of a series of individual choices
made in successive generations to participate in that custom." If that
resource is cultural, it is worth remembering that culture, after all, is
essential to individual autonomy; some may even conceptualize it as a
prerequisite thereof.'.

70. WALLERSTEIN, supra note 28, at 217. We are all too privy to the competing
perspective that the substance of moral norms is contingent and variable. In a historical system that is built on hierarchy and inequality, in the long run, universalism
can only fit the classic formulation that the ruling ideas are the ideas of the dominant. This reality confronts the less dominant party with a double bind: to resist is to
lose; to capitulate is to lose. The only plausible reaction is neither to resist nor to capitulate, or both to resist and to capitulate through tentative expressions of political
will not backed by commitment or the deployment of resources for implementation.
My own work on gender relations in Nigeria reveals how the government promulgated a symbolic legislation to appease the international community. Compare J.
Oloka-Onyango, The Plight of the Larger Half. Human Rights, Gender Violence and
the Legal Status of Refugee and Internally Displaced Women in Africa, 24 DENy. J.
INT'L L. & PoL'Y 349, 355, 390 (1990) (The Convention on the Elmination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women produced a paradox by successfully highlighting, but simultaneously ghettoizing, women's human rights issues within the international legal and political arena).

71.

WALZER,

supra note 64, at 68.

72. Obiora, supra note 37.
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III. Reconceptualizing Universals as Particular?
[W]e are no longer concerned with analyzing or sorting the set of
assertions peculiar to various systems in spreading them out, so to
speak, on a single surface or level in order to examine what conciliation or exchange of ideas they may mutually allow in their inner
structure. But... we shall benefit from them, not by borrowing
from them or exchanging with them certain particular views and
ideas, but by seeing, thanks to them, more profoundly into our own
doctrine, by enriching it from within and extending its principles to
new fields of inquiry which have been brought more forcefully to
our attention, but which we shall make all the more vitally and
powerfully informed by these principles.
Jacques Maritain 4
What are the universals or common cores in human rights and
what provides the content for them? What is the authoritative basis
for any transcultural form of moral judgement, let alone intervention,
in a given locale? How does an investigator go about determining
standards that apply to cultures other than his or hers? Let us assume that recent international instruments seek to regulate a specific
custom that a preponderance of international public opinion finds to
be at odds with existing standards of dignity. However, it turns out
that the target custom has proven quite intractable. Supporters of
the custom argue that resistance invalidates the moral imperative for
the regulations. Proponents of the regulation counter that resistance
is a reasonable reaction that any one could have predicted, especially
given the embeddedness of practice.
Short of bringing all resources of coercion to bear on implementation, is there another way to accelerate acceptance of the intended
reform? Is it merely enough to include voices from within the camp
of adherents to the custom? Whose are these voices? How does one
ensure that they are representative? Are associated difficulties reinforced by concerns that these voices may have been influenced or
conditioned by extraneous discourses? Does it matter whose language they speak when they do in fact speak or are allowed to be
heard? If the argument is that the paradigmatic mode of reform is
instigated from the outside and that it is incongruent with a native

73. I am thankful to Susan Brison, Michael Walzer, Bernard Levinson and Webb
Keane for helping me think through some of the issues discussed in this section.
74. Maritain, supra note 61, at 4041.
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injunction, does the mere inclusion of voices from within resolve the
dilemma? Is there a possibility of retrieving ordinarily occluded indigenous perspectives? Are these in tension and competition with
the dominant native injunction or are they fundamentally reconcilable? Are they merely differentiated but non-discrete overlapping
repertoires? What would it take to marry them with the external imperative or to work toward the determination and articulation of a
more resonant ideal? How does one overcome the intransigence of
any of the parties concerned with sincerely cooperating in a universalist endeavor?
Theoretical inquiry into the foundation of international human
rights is nothing new. It is as old as the concept and institution of
human rights itself, as are contests over theoretical claims. As far
back as 1949, the American Anthropological Association registered a
position against the notion of universal human rights. The issue has
been revisited with remarkable frequency since then. Yet, the problems that it poses refuse to go away. There are grounds to believe
that carefully devised conditions and rules of engagement may
achieve what eluded prior attempts. The position espoused in this article aligns with emerging studies which suggest that abstract inquiries into the theoretical foundation for human rights are apt to be
more elusive than emphasizing the values of the system in resolving
practical problems. '5 Thus far, we are yet to see this kind of emphasis
on practical utility in a meaningful manner. Nevertheless, several
strands of thoughts could be discerned from these studies. Three are
most pertinent here.
The first could be restated in the rather blunt assertion of Richard Rorty about the magnetic pull of pointing out practical advantages. 6 The other is best conveyed by a reiteration of the folk saying,
"How will you keep them on the farm once they have seen the city?"
Similar to Rorty's irresistibility theory, the rationale here is that peo75. Amartya Sen, Capabilityand Well-Being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30 (Mar-

tha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993); Amartya Sen, Gender Inequality and
Theories of Justice, in WOMEN,
CAPABILITIES

CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT:

A STUDY OF HUMAN

259 (Martha Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover eds., 1994); Charles Tay-

lor, Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights, in THE EAST ASIAN
CHALLENGE TO HUMAN RIGHTS (Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds., forthcom-

ing).
76. RORTY, supra note 69, at 209 ("In recommending that ideal, one is not recommending a philosophical outlook, a conception of human nature or of the meaning of human life to representatives of other cultures. All we should do is point out
the practical advantages of liberal institutions.").
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ple would voluntarily embrace human rights objectives if they could
only come to behold them in the full light of all that the rights have to
offer ' I call the last strand of thought that I associate with the studies the functionalist approach. It draws upon the assumption that it is
possible that the bases for human rights are already native to all cultures and that they merely have to be discovered or uncovered. A
cursory review of the history of the human rights movement and the
manifold forms of opposition to it could be taken to suggest that this
may be a somewhat optimistic view. Nonetheless, it is arguable that
the jury is still out on the issue; it is premature to conclude within the
relative short life of human rights that the issue is settled. This is especially true since vigorously problematizing the very notion of human rights is a fairly novel enterprise that is partly traceable to the
independence and inclusion of former colonies in the commonwealth
of nations.
The functionalist approach presupposes the usefulness of an internal critique of culture in illuminating a corpus of ideas that can be
woven together into a coherent core to domesticate or indigenize
human rights. This presupposition is tied to the reasoning that any
given culture is apt to be a diversely constituted plural entity, rather
than a totalizing hegemony. In other words, cultural traditions are
not unitary, self-contained, coherent wholes, but differentiated, contested and dynamic entities. Further, since cultures are frequently internally conflicted and not often marked by strong consensus, they
allow room for criticism and change. It is believed that making the
voices of opposition within explicit will reveal objectives that resonate with extant human rights standards. ' An internal criticism may
77. Literally speaking, the premise may not be borne out in reality. All things
being equal, it is possible that some people will not be particularly attracted to the
city and that they would opt to continue staying on the farm. Decisions to flee or
remain on the farm may derive from various reasons which are themselves either inscrutable or rather revealing.
78. A potential problem is that oppositions that escaped silencing or dissent but
have not been smothered manifest at great risk to life and limb. Consequently, they
may not be readily accessible. The issue gets quite complicated when coupled with
problems related to adapted preference formation, especially where preferences
arise out of circumstances of entrenched deprivation. However, this is not a serious
risk as the constitutiveness of social experience and the embeddedness of the individual within a culture does not preclude the possibility of imagining alternative
ways of being. Alternatively, given the extensive interaction of cultures and ideas, it
is not certain that where there is discernible opposition, those which arc held out as
indigenous have not been influenced by what may qualify as external discourses or
that the culture that is being shielded from scrutiny is not a relatively recent formation.
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reveal parallels between rifts within a dominant cultural paradigm
and outside evaluations of it. As such, a critique of culture does not
have to represent a view from nowhere.
The functionalist approach arose to forestall frustrations resulting from ambiguous and abstract articulations of the imperative for
human rights. The approach stresses practical utility over theory."
Within its framework, human rights could be construed as natural or
ethical and historical constructs based on a notion such as contract,
covenant or community.' In the alternative, human rights could be
predicated on an axiom of state control or what can vaguely be considered "synchronization." The former argument presumes that all
societies that exist with states have some characteristics in common
insofar as the state is the product of certain social formations. It is
this similarity that is posited as a basis for mutual control."' With regards to synchronization, the fundamental assumption is that the farther people get from the cultural base, the less they have to work
with it. Thus, to the extent socio-economic conditions substantially
redefined the terms of existence, standards of practices which were
formulated to govern relationships in the defunct order are of ques-

79. This may be more so with Sen than with Taylor, both of whom I find representative of the approach. See sources cited supra note 75.
80. Any of these notions embody principles of reciprocity and autonomy. Reciprocity binds a nation that elects to participate in the world community to accept obligations that arise therefrom. Strictly invoking this principle does not address the
risks and problems associated with the disparate distribution of power within the
world community which engenders concerns that the obligations may be little more
than the unilateral dictates of the dominant. But, the risk is mediated when the idea
of autonomy comes into play. It denotes that belonging to the world community
does not entail the erasure of the self. A Member State still has its individual identity and constituent elements, even if it is obliged to comply with an injunction that
arises out of a consensus of the world community. Local autonomy does not have to
be subsumed by international consensus. In fact, in some instances where autonomy
is defined as being represented by the voices from below, such consensus is the only
way to enhance and preserve it. This will be the case where a despot or some other
ruler commandeers control by means other than popular election.
81. In lieu of relying on a critique of an institution like custom or the State, one
could start with an activity like living. See, e.g., Sen, supra note 75. But, here, difficulties emerge regarding the Anglo-American assumption that the society is an aggregation of individuals and the body is the only unit of agency when other worlds
may perceive that there is both life and value beyond the body. To circumvent this
problem, it will be important to consider what is the operative conception of "human"? Who are the rights and duties bearers? In a worldview where the living
alone do not constitute the center of the universe, where both the dead and unborn
are part of the equation, how are their interests factored into consideration?
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tionable contemporary relevance. Even if certain aspects of culture
are certifiably traditional, whatever that means, it could still be argued vigorously that they are being applied to a context that is qualitatively different from that for which they were fashioned or envisaged.
There are parallels between Schiesinger's idea of a common core
and the functionalist approach. While Schlesinger was interested in a
convergence of outcomes, however, the functional approach deals
with consonant purposes. Commonalities are not a critical predicate
for a putative functionalist formula; it could work with differences.
In thinking more concretely about how to reconcile the implications
of this approach with an investigation of a common core analogue
that could be absorbed into the human rights apparatus, I am reminded of the very beginning of the treatise by Jerome Hall which,
though somewhat romantic, is on a continuum with the insight echoed above in the epigraph of Maritain.Y Like the epigraph, the remark captures the proposition that if people of different cultures consider the problem of human rights together, any consensus they reach
about critical standards would not be merely the adoption of a dominant perspective. The remark reads as follows:
The differences among human beings often dissolve in the discovery of their basic similarities and, in any case, they become intelligible when viewed in the context of a known pattern. Limited as we
are, we begin with self-knowledge and self-love, and when we discover ourselves in ever-widening dimensions of common experience, friendship and affection increase.84
In one of his books, political philosopher Michael Walzer states
that the hope that the idea of a moral minimum, grounded and expanded, might serve the cause of a universal critique, is a false hope.
Observing that some things we consider oppressive are not so regarded everywhere and that, therefore, we cannot conscript people to
march in our parade, he urged that the presence of a minimum liberates and justifies us in returning to whatever suits our larger moral
understandings.86 But, what is Walzer saying here? Can his view be
used to erect or shore up an argument against the existence of uni82. Obiora, supra note 36.
83. Maritain, supra note 61.
84. HALL, supra note 14, at 3.
85. MICHAEL WALZER, THICK
ABROAD 11 (1994).

86. Id. at 16.

AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT AT HoME AND
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versal human rights? If a group demonstrates that they have indigenous notions of bodily integrity and injunctions against cruelty that
somehow correspond to equivalents in other cultures, they arguably
have a minimal or thin morality. If on account of this, they are free
to return to the thickness that is their own and that thickness entails
genital excision and infibulation, what would be the standard for
criticizing them or for insisting that they conform to extraneous or
alien constructions of bodily integrity? Walzer suggests that one way
to reconcile the arguable tension in his assertion that is envisaged by
this hypothetical would be to show the contradiction between the
ideal the group claims to embrace and the practice in which they, in
fact, engage. In other words, it is possible to conduct an internal critique seeking, for example, to understand what the group considers
cruelty and excision. The scheme could help determine what is cruelty if they fail to see that what some regard as genital mutilation is
cruelty.
If we take the scenario a step further by assuming the group justifies the practice on account of a belief that the life of a newborn is
jeopardized by leaving the genitalia intact, that a baby dies if the
genitalia touches the head, then they may be inclined to differentiate
between degrees of cruelty. Say, for example, that the group highly
celebrates pronatality and life and abhors murder, however that is defined, more than anything else. They may reason that severing some
or all of the genitalia is a modest sacrifice for the benefit of a life.
Moreover, they could see forbearance as a virtue that is attained
through self-mortification. This reasoning may be buttressed by an
empirical finding that the women who are circumcised are conditioned to discount the pain involved in the procedure. What then?
Here, it is evident that alongside the moral disagreement about
what constitutes bodily integrity is a disagreement about facts. It is
possible to demonstrate that the belief about the effect of the genitalia is not borne out by the experiences of women in other places
where children survive, notwithstanding that the mothers are not circumcised. A rebuttal of this counter argument could appeal to the
claim that scientific knowledge is socially constructed and, as such,
not dispositive.' However, it will still be powerful to show the way
things are. If the practical consideration concerns checking against
maternity-related mortality, then it will be helpful to draw from em87. Compare ASHLEY MONTAGU,
ABORIGINES (1937).

COMING INTO BEING AMONG THE AUSTRALIAN
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pirical evidence to expose the blindspot in the phobia against the
genitalia. The disparate views about bodily integrity may not be reconciled, but the group may grow receptive to rethinking some aspects
of their practice. In the process, an alien inquisitor may come to
terms with aspects of her own culture which are incongruent with its
standards for bodily integrity as well. Thus, the contradiction between the minimal and the maximal morality could be resolved
through sustained comparative analysis.
If one can convincingly demonstrate the harm that a practice like
female circumcision is said to constitute to the practitioners, one may
have a good chance of fostering a change in their commitment to the
practice. The underlying assumption here is that cultural participants
are not necessarily impervious to reason. This is not to deny that essential ideology can work against self-interest. Indeed, the risk of
adapted preference makes it more difficult to rely on mere utility. If
utility is a matter of getting people to see what contributes to their
happiness, those desires may be so shaped or distorted by their situation that self-articulated contentment would be a poor guide for determining what constitutes justice or injustice. This is because a practitioner who has been thoroughly imprinted by her culture may
respond to an inquiry about the benefits of circumcision from her
particular location as a subject in the culture that prescribes the practice.
Should this put an end to any further scrutiny? In the wake of
the furor against female circumcision, few would be bold enough to
answer this question in the affirmative. An agreement that the practice is lacking in some material respect does not necessarily or always
have to amount to a prescription that it is subject to prompt change.
It may well become obvious that it is one thing to express indignation
about a particular practice, but it is another thing to actively champion the eradication of the practice."' Fortunately, emerging reports
88. One may then ask the aim of condemning a practice for which change is not

recommended; what is the relevance of moral judgment, if not to induce change? A
hypothetical is in order to clarify the issue here. Consider a situation where a set of
women live with severely constrained choices. They, as well as an outside observer
or critic, appreciate the constraints involved. However, they recognize that to be viable members of their community, they are better off with, rather than without, the
choices as constrained as they are. Speaking more concretely, imagine that the
women live in a traditional setting where they are subject to circumcision and that
circumcision is a prerequisite for marriage, which in turn guarantees access to productive resources. Assume that the women, at least some of them, resent but feel
compelled to comply with the practice just to ensure their livelihood. Further as-
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offer grounds for painting a somewhat different picture.89
The critical contention, therefore, revolves around designating a
particular set of circumstances as problematic. Using an argument
that people will respond to leaves open the question of when to invoke the argument and when to be persuaded or dissuaded. The bottom-line is that posing the question "what works?" does not mean
that anything goes if human rights protection is the decisive goal or
plan of action.' The only question is how one arrives at critical standards for authoritative judgments. A related dilemma also crops up
when difference is emphasized as key. In dealing with this dilemma, I
find Wazer's articulation of the threshold of tolerance helpful. Walzer clarifies that to assert that experience is always necessarily culturally mediated is not to argue that every actual or imaginable difference should be affirmed.9 In his submission, no arrangement is a
moral option unless it upholds basic human rights. We have already
seen, however, that the problem with drawing the threshold or defining the outer limits by invoking the notion of basic human rights is
that the notion itself remains contested.
Given, as was said earlier, that the jury is still out on relevant aspects of the notion, prime among which is the question of the universality of human rights, the resources of comparative law can be useful
for reconciling the conflicts about applicable standards that are available both within and between cultures. Part of the appeal is that
sume that substantial international outcry and innovative strategies of attack have
evolved against the practice. An essence of the distinction between moral judgment
and active intervention lies in recognizing the restrictions against intervention and in
coming to terms with the dilemma that, as reprehensible as one may find the practice, outright prohibition without more may not be in the best interest of the women.
In the final analysis, one still has to ponder the fate of the exceptional woman who is
dissuaded from engaging in the practice but still continues to reside in the community, perhaps ostracized as an anomaly or a renegade.
89. The reference here is to evidence that suggests some progress in the challenge against female circumcision where, on account of education and other containment strategies, communities are substituting less invasive rites for drastic circumcision. This situation could be distinguished from the hypothetical scenario to
the extent that change was effected on a group-wide scale that conceivably took into
consideration, and possibly involved some changes in, the context as opposed to targeting individual women in isolation. See Malik Stan Reaves, Alternative Rite to Female Circumcision Spreading in Kenya, AFRICA NEWS ONLINE (Nov. 1997)
<http:/www.africanews.org/specials/19971119_fgm.html>.
90. Recall Walzer's definition of the boundary of tolerance with human rights
violation. See WALZER, supra note 64.
91. Id. at 6.
92 Id. at 5.
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comparisons can be used to discern and decipher multivocality at the
local level as a first step to meaningful international dialogue.
Through some procedurally just inquiry that does not privilege a particular standpoint as superior or authoritative, a culture which has,
for example, traditionally rejected divorce of religious pluralism may
decide that its present day realities make it necessary to accommodate some form of freedom of religion or divorce.
To the extent that it serves as an indiscriminate barometeric
gauge, investigations of the common core analogue are bound to reveal that human rights are not for export only, given the susceptibility
of even a reputedly decent society to wanton violations. An important gain of such grounding is that it helps sensitize investigators of
how their system is identical with, or differs from, those with which it
is compared. When comparison follows from a proper knowledge of
the phenomena to be compared, chances are that many would come
to appreciate that the constructs of their system are only part of a
broad spectrum of alternatives.93 This is the point that Hall and Martain sought to convey about the beneficial reciprocity of critical engagements. Additionally, rigorous comparison that is based on the
careful observation of the complex workings of a given system can
lead to intimate acquaintance with the object of comparison. This
corresponds with a well-established correlative rule of comparative
analysis that one should start by a clear analysis of one's own system
before proceeding to think comparatively9
The large measure of benefits that accrue from complying with
this rule, therefore, include giving participants a much better understanding of their own system and other systems under investigation."
For instance, an American comparatist who is ordinarily up in arms
against the Indian caste system could come to appreciate how racism
in her own country reduces certain members of her society to a castelike status. In this vein, she could begin to see that, if in fact such
93. It is one thing for students to be so persuaded; it is another to ensure that
students are not being "duped" into mistaking surface appearances for fundamental
reality. Avoiding this requires commitment to standards of rigor and erring on the
side of caution. This is especially true in light of the fact that legal practices and arrangements are usually more diverse and complex than they are readily obvious.

More so than ever, lives are constituted by an intersection of different legal orders or
spaces superposed, interpenetrated and mixed in minds and actions. See Boaventura
de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading,14 J.L. & Soc. 279 (1987).
94. BERNHARD GROSSFELD, THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF COMPARATIVE
LAW 5 (1990).
95. Kahn-Freund, supra note 41.
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members are inhibited from attaining their full potentials and
achieving due merit on account of their arbitrary traits, her system,
regardless of its putative appeal to meritocracy, is not that far removed from social stratification and the ascription of status on
grounds of some pre-determined destiny.
To drive some of these points home, a concrete illustration may
be helpful. In 1998, a report in the New York Times about child marriage in India provoked the outrage of many of my colleagues. In
trying to understand the force of the sentiment and why people are
prone to react so adversely to news like this, I elucidated a number of
scenarios involving basic expressions of human misery. One scenario
depicted a foreigner to America who regularly finds repulsive a pervasive sight to which many residents seem inoculated or studiedly indifferent. I am referring to the sight of people who are forced to
scavenge in dumps for daily sustenance amidst the conspicuous affluence of a city like New York City. A colleague who was inclined to
agree that both scenarios were problematic suggested that it may be
easier to imaginatively empathize with alien children coerced into arranged marriages in distant places than with children rendered
homeless and reduced to the indignities of "dump-diving" in the
"land of plenty." Another colleague suggested that a structured inquiry might reveal the fundamental similarities of the two situations.
Thus, one could begin by asking why it is that the practices under
consideration evoke the revulsion that they do in the first place. In
the case of child marriage, one explanation could be the risk of the
sexual exploitation and violation of the integrity of minors. By the
same token, socially neglected street kids would be seen to suffer
reprehensible injustices that equally jeopardize every aspect of their
own integrity. In this light, if it turns out that in one context the
negative definition of rights as "freedom from" resonates more easily, further inquiry could determine that most people in that context
are open to persuasion about the complementarity of negative and
positive guarantees such as socio-economic rights.' Heretofore, the
prioritization of the different categories of rights has been mouthed
by states to thwart human rights initiatives, notwithstanding that their
citizens and subjects may perceive things differently.
A latent consequence of this inquiry could then be that it has exposed the artificiality of a recurrent bone of contention in human
96. Leslye Obiora, Beyond the Rhetoric of a Right to Development, 18 L. & POL'Y

1 (1996).
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rights discourse, namely the hierarchization of rights. This revelation
from our inquiry points up the need to de-emphasis state actors and
foster the participation of non-governmental players, including organizations and individuals, in human rights discourses. This is
gradually happening with the steady emergence of a nascent transnational civil society whose members aspire to serve as the conscience
of the State. A limitation of the U.N. human rights documents and
procedures is that they have not always looked outside the State to
identify notions of human rights as well as sources of violation. U.N.
deliberations typically obtain in a controlled setting under the pretext
of a consultation among "experts." In and of itself, the process is
somewhat artificial, not to mention that the views of the "experts"
may not be representative. Ad hoc assessments of acts of omission
and commission or of cultural variations with lay persons could be
helpful on occasion. The fact is that there is a link between where
one starts methodologically and the consequences of one's investigative endeavor.
Without an account of some of these discrepancies, there is no
way to explain why universal experience has not already produced
universally acclaimed universal rights. A local argument or grassroots critique may clearly identify the origin of a particular problem.
For example, people laboring under the strictures of structural adjustment do not exactly need to be experts to recognize that their
problems are tied to the workings of the global economy or, as Amartya Sen and his collaborator found, that the causes of famine are political in nature. People confronted with a specific reality such as
famine are more interested in how to address the situation. They are
all too aware that theirs is a concrete situation that requires immediate response and that even a cursory inquiry would point out the
structural underpinnings of the problem.
Some scholars have undermined conclusions that are otherwise
insightful by narrowly defining their focus. Illustrative here is a piece
by Martha Nussbaum that is informed by a number of studies, including Sen's graphic account of gender bias across cultures." Commenting on the findings of these studies, Nussbaum chose to locate
cultural traditions as the dispositive explanation for the plight of
women. In reality, however, particular relations produce particular
97. Martha Nussbaum, Human Capabilities,Female Human Beings, in WOMEN,
CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENr. A STUDY OF HuMiAN CAPABILITIES, supra note 75, at

61.
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results that can only be considered cultural in the broadest sense.
Culture is not a self-contained unit of analysis. When culture is seen
as a mirror of society, not just in terms of its normativity, but as a reflection of the criss-crossing dimensions of the variables that impinge
on society, it is easier to comprehend the artificiality of categorizations of human rights into respective generations. One can begin to
see the complexities of social relations and human rights regulations.
The missing women in Sen's research are not simply the casualties of some misogynistic culture.98 For all the diatribe against culture
and religion, their eradication may still not stop women from disappearing. Listening to the voices of the women, it may be easy to discern that their predicament is far more complex than what is allowed
by a mono-causal explanation. At the very least, poor governance,
imperialism, global capital and the antecedents are just as implicated
as culture in compromising the welfare of women. Yet, neither the
State nor the political economy of imperialism is sufficiently taken
into consideration by Nussbaum.
Understanding how and to what extent this confluence of factors
plays a role in human rights is an integral aspect of formulating a
workable solution to the harsh realities of the day, whether or not
one articulates them in terms of universals. In this light, it may not
actually be necessary to burden the inquiry with controversial philosophical apparatuses or approaches that strain their own premises
and stand in the way of consensus and reform. One does not need
high-sounding idioms and discourses to reckon the sting of pain or
the pang of hunger or to alleviate the situation for that matter.
Dealing with this requires concrete commitments from authorities
who may have different understandings and priorities to which arcane academic discourses cater. Political will is the main thing that
often seems to be lacking and in need of placation and intellectual
justification. People are more likely to agree on practical terms than
on a philosophical standpoint. That is, to the ordinary person on the
street, the practical is what matters the most. It is easier to take affirmative steps to curtail the circumstances that account for missing
women than to agree on a theoretical framework for the undertaking.
More often than not, it is not necessary to conduct an elaborate inquiry into whether or not the provision of basic health care is a good
to which people across the universe subscribe before coming to the
98. Amartya Sen, More Than 100 Women Still Missing, NEW YORK TIMES, Dec.
20, 1990, at 61 (book review).
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conclusion.
IV. Conclusion
By way of conclusion, I wish to reiterate that one of the practical
values of comparative law is that it enhances one's ability to be persuasive in international contexts. This value provides a ground for
optimism about the future of comparative law.' Whether the objective is the harmonization of national laws or the framing, interpretation and application of supranational laws," comparisons across arrangements are morally and politically helpful in thinking about
where we are and what alternatives may be available."0 ' Even if they
do not yield authoritative judgments, they help us appreciate how to
act in the face of paradoxes without either wishing away and ignoring
the paradoxes or being paralyzed by them. Lessons from Schlesinger's project could be invaluable in this regard.
Familiarity with student culture suggests that a student faced
with the embarrassment of riches reflected in some curricula may not
be minded to bother with issues that are packaged to convey the impression that they merely have a limited relevance to immediate local
realities. However, even the cursory exercises depicted above reveal
the far-reaching potentials of comparative law. In explaining the lack
of interest in comparative law, some suggest that the exigencies of
law practice, which require proficiency in the technicalities of national law, are a contributory factor.n It could be said that an opposite set of expectations should be adopted for the purposes of international law. At first glance, it appears that activists and scholars who
engage in different aspects of public international law can be spared
the obligation of acquainting themselves with respective legal systems. This is because the operative principles and doctrines are articulated at the supranational level to guide the conduct of States.
This view, however, is becoming increasingly tenuous. At the end of
the day, it is refreshing that comparatists are careful to re-explore the
agenda for their specialty in the midst of the sea of changes that
beckon the new millennium.
99. Note that some quarrel with the effort to justify comparative law by its practical uses sometime verge on the ridiculous. See, e.g., Sacco, supra note 27, at 1-2.
100. See GLENDON ET AL, supra note 18, at 10.
101. WALZER, supra note 64, at 4.
102. See, e.g., BERNHARD GROSSFIELD, THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF
COMPARATfvE LAW 2 (1990); Robert J. Matineau, Legal Education and Training

Artists of the Law, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 346 (1982).

